Female Board Directorships and Related Party Transactions
基于2005-2018年中国企业数据，研究发现女性董事（包括执行董事和独立董事）能减少关联交易，尤其在国有企业中，且这种减少有助于提升后续经营绩效。
Abstract Using a sample of Chinese firms from 2005 to 2018, we show that firms with female directors (either executive or independent) are characterized by fewer related party transactions (RPTs), particularly in state‐owned enterprises. Fewer RPTs are associated with improved subsequent operating performance and, in contrast, RPTs are associated with decreased performance for firms with no or fewer female directors, suggesting that female directors engage or allow only efficient but not opportunistic RPTs to facilitate the long‐term strategic objectives of their firms. Our findings are robust for using an alternative measure of RPTs, female board directorships and methods to mitigate potential endogeneity issues.