The Trembling Chairman Paradox
研究了主席悖论中主席拥有打破平局权力却可能得到最差结果的现象，通过颤抖手完美均衡和适当均衡等非争议性精炼概念，揭示了该悖论不依赖于弱占优策略迭代剔除程序，并展示了适当性与颤抖手完美性的区别。
The Chairman Paradox (Farquharson, 1969) is a classical observation in voting games showing that a Chairman endowed with tie-breaking power might end up with her worst outcome. The analysis posits three players whose preferences build a Condorcet cycle and invokes Iterated Elimination of Weakly Dominated Strategies (IEWDS) to select a unique equilibrium. However, IEWDS is a controversial procedure which exhibits well-known weaknesses. This work relies on non-controversial equilibrium refinements instead. For any cardinal payoffs representing the preferences, two pure-strategy equilibria are trembling-hand perfect, the paradoxical one and another one where the Chairman attains her best outcome. The original paradox is restored (and shown not to actually depend on IEWDS) if one considers the stronger concept of proper equilibrium. The analysis casts new light on a classical paradox and illustrates the difference between properness and trembling-hand perfection in a relevant example.