Corporate Governance and Profit Shifting: The Role of the Audit Committee
研究了跨国公司审计委员会特征如何影响利润转移行为，发现审计委员会规模越大利润转移越多，但审计专家成员和CEO不兼任董事长会削弱这一效应。
We examine tax-motivated profit shifting as the outcome of corporate governance characteristics in multinational enterprises (MNEs). We propose a novel subsidiary-year measure of profit shifting, estimated from the responses of subsidiary profits to exogenous parent earnings shocks. Subsequently, we hypothesize that audit committee size and experience, as well as CEO duality are key factors affecting profit shifting. Our baseline results show that increasing audit committee size by one standard deviation increases profit shifting by an economically significant 7.8%. We also find that this positive effect reverses for MNEs with higher numbers of audit committee members who have audit expertise and for MNEs without CEO duality.