Performance management, gaming and regulatory monitoring: a theoretical model and applications
本文用博弈论分析绩效管理中的虚假报告、数据操纵等博弈行为，提出通过透明、软性的监管监控而非直接控制来减少博弈、促进生产性努力，对管理者和政策制定者有参考价值。
This paper addresses the problems of gaming behaviour as expressed in untruthful reporting, manipulation of data and performance measures, and distortion of information. We apply game-theoretical principal-agent reasoning that refers to the marginal costs and benefits of gaming and oversight, pointing to policy measures for ensuring more effort exerted in productive activity rather than in gaming activity. These measures are the regulatory monitoring of agents’ activities rather than the control and supervision of them. We base our suggestions on behavioural economics and nudge research. Regulatory monitoring mechanisms are transparent and ‘soft’, so they moderate the adversarial nature of principal-agent relations.