Divide and conquer in two‐sided markets: A potential‐game approach
证明许多双边市场模型是加权势博弈，通过势最大化方法选择均衡，发现平台常补贴一方而向另一方收费，补贴方由交叉网络效应决定。
Abstract Network effects typically generate multiple equilibria in two‐sided markets. To overcome the methodological challenge of selecting an appropriate equilibrium, this article shows that many two‐sided market models are weighted potential games, and therefore, a refinement of Nash equilibrium justified by many theoretical and experimental studies, potential maximization, pins down an equilibrium. Under potential maximization, platforms often subsidize one side and charge the other, that is, divide and conquer. The primary determinant of which side to subsidize/monetize is cross‐side network effects. This divide‐and‐conquer strategy implies that platforms are often designed to favor the money side much more than the subsidy side.