Democratic Political Economy of Financial Regulation
研究发现，宽松的金融监管可能导致银行以低于精算公平利率发放风险抵押贷款，推高房价，使年轻中等财富家庭和老年房主受益，而租房者和高非住房财富者受损；当受益者占多数时，监管失败可能成为民主结果。
ABSTRACT We establish that inefficiently lax financial regulation can arise democratically. Lax regulation leads to banks issuing risky mortgages at less than actuarially fair interest rates. This creates additional demand for houses and increases house prices, generating nontrivial distribution of winners and losers. Renters and individuals with large nonhousing wealth suffer from the induced banking fragility, while young middle‐wealth households benefit from mispriced mortgages and old homeowners benefit from higher house prices. When these latter two groups constitute a majority, regulatory failure can be a democratic outcome. Voting patterns in US Congress provide empirical support for this mechanism.