The Stakeholder Corporation and Social Welfare
定义利益相关者公司为最大化顾客和供应商剩余的企业，发现其虽难衡量但可通过约束利润最大化实现，且比普通公司更有利于社会福利，并论证了长期进入决策应基于经庇古税修正的利润。
The stakeholder (or responsible) firm is dened in this paper as one that maximizes the (weighted or unweighted) sum of the surpluses of its customers and suppliers (including workers). We show that, although this objective is hard to empirically measure, it can be pursued by simple management rules that rely onconstrained profit maximization. We find that unconstrained prot maximization gives a competitive edge to ordinary firms, but that stakeholder firms are better for social welfare and internalize several important effects of their activities on society. We also show that long term entry decisions should rely on profit modified by Pigouvian pricing of externalities, incidentally providing a novel justication for the polluter-pays principle.