Policy Uncertainty and Textual Disclosure
研究了1996年至2015年美国政策不确定性如何影响公司文本披露，发现政策不确定性增加了披露长度，但降低了可读性并增加了不确定性和负面语气，而外部监督可缓解可读性下降，投资者认为此类披露有价值。
SYNOPSIS We study how policy uncertainty influences textual disclosure in the U.S. from 1996 to 2015. Consistent with incentives for voluntary disclosure, we find that policy uncertainty increases textual disclosure quantity, as evident in disclosure length, but lowers textual readability and increases the tone of uncertainty and negativity. We also document that the negative impact on readability subsides when firms are subject to tough external monitoring. Finally, we provide evidence implying that investors perceive such disclosure to be valuable, as evident in cheaper equity financing costs under economic policy uncertainty. JEL Classifications: D72; G14; G18; G34.