Input price discrimination by resale market
分析了垄断供应商对在不同市场转售的零售商实行价格歧视的供应关税，发现歧视能提高配置效率，并在特定条件下增加产出和福利，对线上销售的纵向约束政策有启示。
Abstract This article analyzes supply tariffs that discriminate between resale in different markets. In a setting with competing retailers that operate in multiple (independent or interdependent) markets, we show that, all else equal, a monopolist supplier wants to discriminate against resale in the market with the higher aggregate cross‐seller diversion ratio. We find that discrimination can improve allocative efficiency and present sufficient conditions, involving the pass‐through rates and the market demand curvatures in the different markets, under which discrimination has positive effects on output and welfare. Our insights are relevant for the policy treatment of vertical restraints on online sales.