Do U.S. Investors Value Foreign Component Auditors?
研究美国投资者在评估跨国公司价值时是否考虑外国组成部分审计师，发现投资者对PCAOB检查权限受限和检查结果有显著反应。
ABSTRACT We examine whether investors consider foreign component auditors when assessing the value of U.S. multinational corporations (MNCs) using two sets of Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) international regulatory events. We find investors react negatively when the PCAOB is denied access to inspect foreign component auditors in jurisdictions where a U.S. MNC has significant operations and positively when those countries later allow inspection. For foreign component auditors that are inspected, we find investors react positively when they receive clean inspection reports and negatively when they fail to remediate quality control deficiencies. Consistent with PCAOB international oversight providing additional assurance about foreign component auditor quality, our collective results indicate investors consider foreign component auditors when valuing U.S. MNCs.