Liability for robots II: an economic analysis
提出一种新的责任规则——制造商剩余责任，让操作者和受害者对自身疏忽负责，制造商对非疏忽事故承担剩余责任，从而激励各方优化安全投入，降低安全机器人价格并淘汰不安全技术。
Abstract This is the second of two companion papers that discuss accidents caused by robots. In the first paper (Guerra et al. , 2021), we presented the novel problems posed by robot accidents, and assessed the related legal approaches and institutional opportunities. In this paper, we build on the previous analysis to consider a novel liability regime, which we refer to as ‘manufacturer residual liability’ rule. This makes operators and victims liable for accidents due to their negligence – hence, incentivizing them to act diligently; and makes manufacturers residually liable for non-negligent accidents – hence, incentivizing them to make optimal investments in R&D for robots' safety. In turn, this rule will bring down the price of safer robots, driving unsafe technology out of the market. Thanks to the percolation effect of residual liability, operators will also be incentivized to adopt optimal activity levels in robots' usage.