The impact of takeover anticipation on rival firms
利用手工收集的大样本数据，首次观察预期接管出价对目标公司竞争对手的初始财富影响，发现竞争对手在谣言日附近的收益与其在一年内成为目标或竞价方相关。
Abstract This paper utilizes a large, hand‐collected dataset to observe for the first time the initial wealth impact of an anticipated takeover bid on the target's rival. Distinguishing among predominant theories of acquisition probability, collusion, competitive advantage, hubris and industry growth, we find substantial evidence to support the premise that gains to rivals around the target firm's rumor date are associated with becoming either a target or a bidding firm within 1 year. Additionally, factors at the time of bid anticipation serve as useful predictors when assessing which rivals will receive or initiate a bid for corporate control. Our results demonstrate that takeover rumors represent an early and important mechanism by which information is transferred throughout an industry.