Insurance decisions under nonperformance risk and ambiguity
实验发现，当保险公司不赔付的风险存在模糊性时，人们更少购买保险，尤其是风险谨慎者，这解释了为何人们为自然灾害等低概率或远期风险投保不足。
An important societal problem is that people underinsure against risks that are unlikely or occur in the far future, such as natural disasters and long-term care needs. One explanation is that uncertainty about the risk of non-reimbursement induces ambiguity averse and risk prudent decision makers to take out less insurance. We set up an insurance experiment to test this explanation. Consistent with the theoretical predictions, we find that the demand for insurance is lower when the nonperformance risk is ambiguous than when it is known and when decision makers are risk prudent. We cannot attribute the lower take-up of insurance to our measure of ambiguity aversion, probably because ambiguity attitudes are richer than aversion alone. SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s11166-021-09364-7.