Trading Blocs: Bane or Blessing?
本文介绍贸易集团的形式、理论基础、规模和影响，探讨其发展原因、当前重要性及未来在世界贸易体系中的作用，帮助理解区域主义与多边主义的关系。
This paper provides an introduction to Trading Blocs; it investigates their forms, underlying rationales, size, and effects. Although precise measurement of gains and/or losses from free trade zones is not possible, this paper looks at the reasons for their development, their importance today, and their probable future role in the world trading system. INTRODUCTION Not since the early 1950s has the issue of trading blocs been in the limelight as much as in recent years. With the 21st century fast approaching, what draws us to this halfcentury old concept? Were the attempts of the 1950s progressive? Or is it that today's direction is regressive? Do we further world welfare through disparate bilateral agreements or through a single multilateral arrangement such as the World Trade Organization? Or is it possible for multilateralism and regionalism to co-exist in harmony? This paper addresses various issues of free trade zones. It investigates their forms, their underlying rationales, their size, and their effects. Various degrees of regionalization exist. They include, in order of increasing levels of fusion and commonality in economic purpose, the following: Preferential Trading Arrangement (PTA): The members have a different (lower) tariff between them as compared to the rest of the world. Free Trade Area (FTA): The signatories have a zero tariff on each other's goods. Customs Union (CU): They are FTAs but with the same external trade measures for all the members. Common Market (CM): There is unrestricted movement of factors of production and products between member countries. Economic Union (EU): It is a CM with further commonality and fusion in terms of micro and macroeconomic policies. The term regional integration (RIA) is borrowed from Anderson and Blackhurst (1993) and is used to encompass all these arrangements. THE ECONOMIC RATIONALE FOR AND EFFECTS OF REGIONAL ECONOMIC INTEGRATION For maximizing welfare, the formation of customs unions (CUs) is well recognized as a second best to the Pareto optimal of free trade. This stems from the discrimination inherent in a trading arrangement towards nonmembers, as opposed to the simple welfare improving option of unilateral reduction of tariffs. The traditional theories of customs unions failed to provide a convincing economic rationale for their formation; therefore, political rationales began to appear. Many argued that developing countries, with their own political and economic logic for protection of domestic industry, may find CUs more economical than protection because of significant economies of scale and the protection afforded by the inception of a arrangement. Most work in this area has concentrated on static specialization effects; however, recently the more dynamic effects have been receiving attention. Static Effects. The static analysis has its roots in Jacob Viner (1950), wherein a firm distinction was made between trade-creating and trade-diverting unions. Trade creation refers to the trade among trading partners, with the intention of weeding out inefficient industries in the member countries. Trade-diversion on the other hand refers to blocking off product from more efficient industries outside the union. Meade (1955) and Lipsey (1960) suggested the possibility of further gains through the consumption effect. Elimination of tariffs through the formation of a customs union reduces the cost of production thereby improving the pattern of consumption. This was called trade expansion by Meade. Lipsey even argued that a purely trade diverting customs union may be welfare improving if the consumption effect dominates the trade loss. Thus there are three ways in which trade flows affect the national welfare: (a) trade creation, (b) trade diversion, and (c) trade expansion. In this framework the problem of predicting the prospective benefits of a agreement becomes formidable because the effect of every good on national welfare, through each of these channels, is potentially indeterminate. …