Policymakers' Interest Rate Preferences: Recent Evidence for Three Monetary Policy Committees
本文估计了美联储、英格兰银行和瑞典央行的泰勒规则，发现过去十年中委员会成员的利率偏好存在系统性差异，且偏好分布符合对称正态分布，成员身份（主席、内部或外部成员）部分解释了这些差异。
This paper estimates (pooled) Taylor-type rules based on real-time information for three monetary policy committees: the FOMC, the Bank of England’s MPC, and the Riksbank’s Executive Board. Tests for heterogeneity among committee members provide new empirical evidence on the distribution of policymakers’ interest rate preferences and their individual reaction patterns to economic shocks. For all three committees we find preference heterogeneity to be systematic over the last decade. Policymakers’ preference distributions are found to be consistent with an underlying symmetric normal distribution. Disagreements among members mainly relate to their shortrun response to shocks. Additional cluster analyses exploiting individual response parameters to shocks from the reaction functions show that the membership status (chairman, internal member, external member) explains some of the heterogeneity in members’ preferences and responses.