影子链接

Shadow links

Journal of Economic Theory · 2021
被引 6
人大 AABS 4

中文导读

提出一个网络形成框架,玩家可形成公开链接和他人通常观察不到的影子链接,引入理性化猜想成对稳定性概念,分析稳定网络的存在性与性质。

Abstract

We propose a framework of network formation where players can form two types of links: public links observed by everyone and shadow links generally not observed by others. We introduce a novel solution concept called rationalizable conjectural pairwise stability, which generalizes Jackson and Wolinsky (1996)'s pairwise stability notion to accommodate shadow links. We first show that a network is stable if there exist beliefs such that each player conjectures to be in a network that is stable under correct beliefs, and in which she does not want to alter her links unilaterally. We then derive a mechanism to construct a stable network that is not stable under correct beliefs. Third, we establish that the set of stable networks is shrinking in the players' observation radius. Finally, we illustrate our framework in the context of two specific models and show that players may over(under)estimate others' connections and hence under(over)connect.

网络形成影子链接可理性化猜想成对稳定性观察半径