Wage Exploitation as Disequilibrium Price
本文批判了将工资剥削视为非均衡价格的观点，通过新古典、新制度与奥地利经济学分析，认为经济效率与剥削直觉无关。
There are two opposing views concerning intuitive cases of wage exploitation. The first denies that they are cases of exploitation at all. It is based on the nonworseness claim : there is nothing wrong with a discretionary mutually beneficial employment relationship. The second is the reasonable view : some employment relationships can be exploitative even if employers have no duty towards their employees. This article argues that the reasonable view does not completely defeat defences of wage exploitation, because these do not rely solely on the nonworseness claim. They also rely on the idea, popularised by Alan Wertheimer, that exploitation is a form of disequilibrium price occurring in defective markets. The article then proceeds to criticise Wertheimer’s account through neoclassical, new institutional, and Austrian economics. It concludes that considerations for economic efficiency are irrelevant to assessing intuitions regarding exploitation.