How did the Sarbanes–Oxley Act affect managerial incentives? Evidence from corporate acquisitions
研究了萨班斯-奥克斯利法案通过前后，股权激励对收购决策风险的影响，发现法案削弱了激励与风险的正向关系，但通过期权和风险敏感性仍能提升长期绩效。
Abstract We examine the impact of incentive compensation on the riskiness of acquisition decisions before and after the passage of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act (SOX). Before SOX, equity-based compensation was positively related to changes in risk around acquisition decisions, but this relationship weakened after the introduction of SOX. The drop in post-SOX acquisition-related risk stems from how managers respond to compensation-based incentives in the new regulatory environment. We show that executive stock options and pay-risk sensitivity drive post-SOX managerial responsiveness to risk-taking incentives. We also document a post-SOX value-enhancing effect on long-term stock-price performance and total factor productivity through these same incentive compensation mechanisms. The results are robust to selection bias, simultaneity, measurements of risk, and the definition of incentive compensation.