Do quality incentive payments improve cooperative performance? The case of small French agricultural cooperatives
研究了法国小型农业合作社基于成员产品质量的差异化支付对合作社绩效的影响，发现激励支付能减少搭便车行为并提升声誉，对绩效有非线性正向作用。
Abstract Small agricultural cooperatives are increasingly using differentiated payments based on the quality of their members’ products. Such cooperatives make a trade‐off between the return on investment in quality and members’ disengagement from the cooperative. Based on data from the five‐year survey of small French agricultural cooperatives, we analyse the effect of incentive payments on small cooperatives’ performances. We investigate how incentive payments can reduce the problem of free riders and improve these cooperatives’ reputation. Using a quantile regression method, while controlling for the potential endogeneity of incentive payments, we show that quality‐based compensation can rule out cooperative members’ defrauding options. This remuneration has a non‐linear positive effect on small cooperatives’ performances. The results suggest that incentive payments improve small cooperatives’ performances.