The reinforcement paradox: Monetary incentives and Bayesian updating
通过两个预注册实验，研究了金钱激励在贝叶斯更新任务中有时反而降低绩效的“强化悖论”，发现激励在存在输赢线索时会同时增加强化行为的错误率和贝叶斯更新的正确率。
We report the results of two pre-registered experiments designed to study the reinforcement paradox: increased incentives often fail to increase and sometimes even decrease performance in Bayesian updating tasks. We argue that, in the presence of win/loss cues, higher incentives have two countervailing effects: increased error rates for reinforcement behavior (win-stay, lose-shift) and increased performance for decisions resulting from Bayesian updating. We find some evidence that incentives increase performance when the win/loss cue is removed whereas when reinforcement is active the effects of incentives are mixed.