Contract Farming as a Last-resort Option to Finance Rice Cultivation in Senegal
研究了塞内加尔河谷594个水稻农场的数据，发现农民参与合同农业随时间变化，取决于融资资本可用性；有信用的农民用三方营销合同留在正规信贷市场，负债农民则把生产合同作为最后信贷手段。
We investigate the role of contracts in farmers’ access to credit over time using the conceptual framework of livelihoods and the economics of rural organisations. We applied multi-component analysis to a dataset of 594 rice farms in the Senegal river valley, analysed changes in 72 producer organisations’ funding strategies over time, and conducted 85 semi-directed interviews. Results show that individual farmers’ participation in contract farming varies over time, mainly depending on the availability of their financing capital. While bank creditworthy farmers use tripartite marketing contracts to remain in the formal segment of the credit market, indebted farmers use production contracts as a last-resort credit option before they are excluded from the credit market. We discuss the positive contributions contracts make to farmers’ livelihoods as they correct failures on the credit market, but they can also trap farmers in less economically profitable relationships.