Satisficing or maximizing in public–private partnerships? A laboratory experiment on strategic bargaining
通过实验室实验，研究公私合作伙伴关系（PPP）中公共部门和私营部门代理人在再谈判时的行为差异，发现公共代理人更倾向于寻求满意的合同，而私营代理人追求效用最大化，且这种差异在损失情境下更明显。
Cross-sectoral strategic negotiation is a key challenge in PPPs. Based on framing and game theory, we investigate the effect of sectoral agency, affect, and bargaining domain on sectoral agents’ bargaining behaviour in a PPP renegotiation scenario. Results confirm that public agents are more likely to bargain for satisfactory, ‘good enough’ contracts than private agents, who maximize their utility. This difference is stronger in the loss vis-a-vis the gain domain. These experimental findings advance our understanding of psychological mechanisms underlying cross-sectoral negotiations, suggesting that public managers and policy-makers account for partners’ dissimilar bargaining logics to prevent asymmetric loss socialization in PPPs.