Optimal fund menus
研究基金经理在必须使用线性定价且不了解投资者对某风险资产信念时，如何设计最优基金菜单，发现最优菜单涉及资产捆绑，且激励相容导致基金低效偏向无信息摩擦的资产。
Abstract We study the optimal design of a menu of funds by a manager who is required to use linear pricing and does not observe the beliefs of investors regarding one of the risky assets. The optimal menu involves bundling of assets and can be constructed from the solution to a calculus of variations problem that optimizes over the indirect utility that each type receives. We provide a complete characterization of the optimal menu and show that the need to maintain incentive compatibility leads the manager to offer funds that are inefficiently tilted towards the asset that is not subject to the information friction.