An Experimental Analysis of the Effects of Imperfect Compliance on Technology Adoption
通过实验研究不完全合规下激励企业采用清洁技术的效果，发现弱执法导致逃税、许可证价格下降和清洁技术采纳率降低，最终增加总排放。
Abstract We present the results of an experimental investigation on incentives to adopt cleaner abatement technologies in the presence of imperfect compliance. We consider two emission control instruments—emission taxes and tradable permits—as well as different combinations of the inspection probability and fine for non-compliance, which can result in full or weak enforcement scenarios. We review and qualify existing theoretical predictions in several ways and find the main result is that allowing for weak enforcement causes tax evasion, reductions in permit prices and lower adoption rates of cleaner abatement technologies. As a result, there are increases in aggregate emissions. Finally, treatments with tradable permits under weak enforcement encounter insufficient trading.