Funding Public Goods through Dedicated Taxes on Private Goods
研究私人商品专用税（用于公共物品融资）在混合公共物品博弈模型中的效果，发现专用税可能增加或减少被征税商品的需求，且最优税率通常无法实现帕累托最优，但能产生条件有效均衡，其公共物品供给水平取决于私人与公共物品的互补或替代关系。
We examine dedicated taxes (i.e., taxes on private goods used to finance public good provision) in a game-theoretic model of impure public goods. We show that a dedicated tax can increase or decrease demand for the taxed good. The optimal dedicated tax generally cannot achieve the Pareto-optimal allocation, but it can generate a conditionally efficient equilibrium with comparatively more or less public good provision, depending in part on complementarity or substitutability between the private and public good. We also demonstrate a neutrality result: when individuals can make direct donations, sufficiently low dedicated taxes will not impact equilibrium allocation.