Does corruption distance affect cross‐border acquisitions? Different tales from developed and emerging markets
研究发现腐败距离与跨境并购量呈倒U型关系，高腐败距离的并购后绩效更差，但持股比例高的跨国公司表现更好；所有权策略随腐败距离变化，且发达与新兴市场存在差异。
Abstract Using a large sample of cross‐border deals, we find an inverted U‐shaped relationship between corruption distance and cross‐border acquisition (CBA) volume. CBAs involving higher corruption distance show negative post‐acquisition performance. However, multinational enterprises (MNEs) with larger equity stakes deliver superior gains. We find that the ownership strategy varies with levels of corruption distance. MNEs mitigate adverse selection and moral hazard problems by acquiring targets from a related industry and targets with a foothold. We demonstrate that CBA activity and ownership strategy vary between developed and emerging economies and both ‘level’ and ‘direction’ of corruption distance are important in its effect on CBAs.