The role of markets on resource conflicts*
研究提出资源冲突的一般理论，发现资源诅咒或祝福取决于市场条件和生产技术。当资源价格外生时，资源价值增加加剧冲突；当价格内生或市场缺失时，冲突与资源稀缺性关系取决于技术或偏好。
Abstract We develop a generalized theory of resource conflict. We demonstrate that the existence of a resource curse (or blessing) relies on two fundamental elements: (i) market conditions; and (ii) the production technology or agents’ preferences, depending on the context under study. When resource prices are treated as exogenous, we obtain the conventional result: an increase in the value of the resource rent, due to an increase in its price or its availability (or lower opportunity cost of appropriation), increases conflict. However, when the price of the contestable resource is endogenously determined (i.e., in local markets) or if markets do not exist, we find that the relationship between conflict intensity and resource abundance depends on the production technology or on agents’ preferences: conflict can increase when the contestable resource becomes scarcer. Therefore, our paper identifies a fundamental transmission mechanism in resource conflicts.