Jam-Barrel Politics
利用哥伦比亚道路建设数据、立法投票记录和泄露的合同分配数据库，研究了行政部门用中央分配的利益（果酱）换取立法支持的现象，发现被分配项目的成本过高、摇摆议员更易被选中，且合同签署后议员对行政部门的支持增加。
Abstract This paper studies the executive-legislative exchange of centrally allocated benefits (jam) for legislative support in Colombia using data from road building projects, legislative roll-call votes, and a leaked database which uncovered the assignment of road contracts to individual legislators. We draw hypotheses from a model in which an executive spreads jam to sway legislators. We document that assigned projects had excess costs, legislators targeted were more likely to be swing voters in congress, and legislators increased their support for the executive after their contracts were signed. The results are driven by legislators representing remote regions and constituencies with weaker political institutions.