Private contracts in two‐sided platforms
研究双边平台与卖家签订私人合同的影响，发现合同保密导致买卖双方相互套牢问题，降低平台利润和社会福利；平台通过增强对卖家价格的控制来提高透明度并承诺不机会主义行事，从而提升利润和福利。
Abstract We study a platform that signs private contracts with sellers. Contractual secrecy implies interrelated hold‐up problems for buyers and sellers that reduce platform profits and welfare. By increasing its control over sellers' prices, the platform is able to increase price transparency and commit to not behaving opportunistically, which increases profits and welfare. Thus, policy prescriptions for dealing with contractual secrecy are reversed in the case of two‐sided platforms. We also find a platform may benefit from an erosion of its market power on one side of the market because this erosion may raise the surplus it offers the other side.