Multinational Banks and Financial Stability
研究了宏观审慎政策中的国际合作空间，发现跨国银行在各国经营中引发并受资产甩卖影响，非合作的国家监管会导致对本国银行监管不足、对外国银行监管过度，但使用庇古税可达到全球最优。
Abstract We study the scope for international cooperation in macroprudential policies. Multinational banks contribute to and are affected by fire sales in countries they operate in. National governments setting quantity regulations noncooperatively fail to achieve the globally efficient outcome, underregulating domestic banks and overregulating foreign banks. Surprisingly, noncooperative national governments using revenue-generating Pigouvian taxation can achieve the global optimum. Intuitively, this occurs because governments internalize the business value of foreign banks through the tax revenue collected. Our theory provides a unified framework to think about international bank regulations and yields concrete insights with the potential to improve on the current policy stance.