Implementing (Un)fair Procedures: Containing Favoritism When Unequal Outcomes are Inevitable
研究在必须从多名候选人中选一人时，分配者因与受助者相似而产生偏袒，并测试了四种干预措施（如透明化、随机化、委托决策、避免信息）以减少偏袒、促进公平程序的效果。
Abstract We study the selection of people when unequal payoffs are inevitable, but fair procedures are feasible, as in selecting one person from several candidates for a job. We show that allocators may be influenced by their similarity with a recipient, leading to favoritism in outcomes. We study four interventions to reduce favoritism and induce fair procedures, without restricting the allocator’s decisions: transparency of the allocation process; a private randomization device; allowing the allocator to delegate to a public randomization device; and allowing the allocator to avoid information about recipients. Making use of beliefs and fairness judgments, we show why some interventions work, while others do not.