Co-investment deterrence
研究了新网络部署中的共同投资与接入问题，发现当成本分摊基于已验证支出且信息不对称时，在位企业可能通过过度投资来阻遏共同投资，且部分阻遏发生在中等吸引力区域。
We examine co-investment and access in a model of new network deployment. We show that the incumbent firm may find it optimal to deter co-investment by over-investing when the cost-sharing rule is based on its verified expenditure and the information on the deployment cost is asymmetric between the operators and the regulator. When partial deterrence is optimal, it occurs in the areas of intermediate attractiveness, consistently with the evidence found in other industries. A necessary and sufficient condition for deterrence to occur is that local industry profits are lower with than without co-investment. Results are robust to demand uncertainty.