The impacts of suppliers and mutual outsourcing on organizational forms
研究了下游双寡头企业共享一个垄断供应商并相互外包时，企业是否将生产委托给销售经理对利润和社会福利的影响，发现只有一方委托时该企业会变得不那么激进，双方都委托可能提高利润但降低社会福利。
Abstract We consider a downstream duopoly model with a monopolistic common supplier and mutual outsourcing between the two symmetric downstream firms. The market structure captures the recent procurement environment in the smartphone industry. We also incorporate managerial delegation into the duopoly model because deciding on organizational forms within a firm is critical to achieving better performance in almost all industries. There is an equilibrium in which only one of the firms delegates its downstream production to its sales manager. A delegating firm becomes less aggressive. The profits when both firms delegate can be higher than those when no firm delegates. Social welfare when both firms delegate can be smaller than that when no firm delegates.