Bidding and Drilling under Uncertainty: An Empirical Analysis of Contingent Payment Auctions
研究了或有支付拍卖中拍卖设计如何影响投标和事后投资激励，以二叠纪盆地石油租赁为例，发现道德风险影响不同拍卖设计的相对收入排名，且现有设计无法同时提高收入和钻探率。
Auctions are often used to sell assets whose future cash flows require the winner to make postauction investments. When winners’ payments are contingent on these cash flows, auction design can influence both bidding and incentives to exert effort after the auction. We propose a model of contingent payment auctions that links auction design to postauction economic activity. In the context of oil leases in the Permian Basin, we show that moral hazard affects the relative revenue ranking of different auction designs. Among a large class of alternatives, the observed design cannot be changed to increase both revenues and drilling rates.