Intelligence, Errors, and Cooperation in Repeated Interactions
通过囚徒困境重复博弈实验，研究不同智商水平群体混合互动对合作率、收益及策略选择的影响，发现高智商者与低智商者混合时合作率更高，但高智商者会采取更严厉策略。
Abstract We study how strategic interaction and cooperation are affected by the heterogeneity of cognitive skills of groups of players, over consecutive plays of repeated games with randomly matched opponents using Prisoner’s Dilemma as stage game. We observe overall higher cooperation rates and average final payoffs in integrated treatment groups—where subjects of different IQ levels interact together—than in separated treatment groups. Lower IQ subjects are better off and higher IQ subjects are worse off in integrated groups than in separated groups. Higher IQ subjects adopt harsher strategies when they are pooled with lower IQ subjects than when they play separately. We demonstrate that this outcome should be expected in learning and evolutionary models where higher intelligence subjects exhibit lower frequency of errors in the implementation of strategies. Estimations of errors and strategies in our experimental data are consistent with the model’s assumptions and predictions.