Behavioural Agency and Firm Productivity: Revisiting the Incentive Alignment Qualities of Stock Options
基于行为代理理论，研究CEO股票期权财富如何通过提升企业生产率来增加企业价值，并探讨CEO层面和企业层面的边界条件。
Abstract Drawing on behavioural agency theory, we revisit the incentive alignment qualities of stock options. Using behavioural agency’s logic, we theorize that chief executive officers (CEOs) are likely to perceive efforts directed at firm productivity as a means of protecting their option wealth (the value of previously awarded stock options). Our reasoning suggests that CEO option wealth positively influences firm productivity and that productivity mediates the relationship between CEO option wealth and firm value. Our theory also points to boundary conditions at the CEO level and the firm level. Our study advances research on the utility of stock options by focusing on effort and productivity as the mechanism through which option incentives affect CEO behaviours. We demonstrate that option risk bearing can align CEO–shareholder interests.