P2P Lenders versus Banks: Cream Skimming or Bottom Fishing?
研究从银行与P2P贷款机构竞争模型推导出三个可检验预测，并用德国数据验证，发现P2P贷款机构在监管冲击使部分银行处于竞争劣势时更倾向于“底部捕捞”。
Abstract We derive three testable predictions from a bank-P2P lender model of competition: (a) P2P lending grows when some banks are faced with exogenously higher regulatory costs; (b) P2P loans are riskier than bank loans; and (c) the risk-adjusted interest rates on P2P loans are lower than those on bank loans. We test these predictions against data on P2P loans and the consumer bank credit market in Germany and find empirical support. Overall, our analysis indicates that P2P lenders are bottom fishing, especially when regulatory shocks create a competitive disadvantage for some banks.