Informal Risk Sharing with Local Information
研究了风险分担网络中契约限制（如可观测性、可验证性）对帕累托效率的影响，推导出效率条件，并发现网络中心性与消费波动正相关，为实证风险分担检验提供了新框架。
Abstract This article considers the effect of contracting limitations in risk-sharing networks, arising for example from observability, verifiability, complexity, or cultural constraints. We derive necessary and sufficient conditions for Pareto efficiency under these constraints in a general setting, and we provide an explicit characterization of Pareto efficient bilateral transfer profiles under CARA utility and normally distributed endowments. Our model predicts that network centrality is positively correlated with consumption volatility, as more central agents become quasi-insurance providers to more peripheral agents. The proposed framework has important implications for the empirical specification of risk-sharing tests, allowing for local risk-sharing groups that overlap within the village network.