Real Effects of Private Country-by-Country Disclosure
研究了2016年欧洲强制要求跨国公司向税务机关提交私人国别报告后，企业在欧洲的资本和劳动投资增加，尤其在低税率国家更明显，同时企业为降低税务执法风险而调整资本配置并简化组织架构。
ABSTRACT We investigate the effects of mandatory private Country-by-Country Reporting (CbCR) to European tax authorities on multinational firms' capital and labor investments, as well as their organizational structures. We exploit the threshold-based application of this 2016 disclosure rule to conduct difference-in-differences and regression discontinuity tests. We document increases in capital and labor expenditures in Europe, but these effects are more pronounced in countries with preferential tax regimes. Cross-sectional tests and analysis using consolidated financial data provide evidence consistent with multinational firms reallocating capital across Europe to mitigate increased tax enforcement risk, as well as with CbCR hindering capital investment efficiency. We also find evidence consistent with firms responding to CbCR by reducing organizational complexity. Collectively, our results support the conclusion that mandatory private CbCR causes firms to change real investment activities to substantiate their tax avoidance activities in Europe while reducing the appearance of aggressive tax practices. JEL Classifications: H20; H25; H26; H32; K22; L51; M41; M48; O47.