Procedural Rationality in Westminster Systems: HowDe‐SeparationAffects the Decision Premise
研究了威斯敏斯特行政体系中政治任命官员与职业公务员的分离如何影响决策前提，利用澳大利亚和英国证据追踪政治职业的去分离及其对政策形成的负面影响。
Abstract Westminster administrative systems were characterized by a clear separation between the political careers and roles of elected ministers and career civil servants. The former set the values or aims of the organization; the latter utilize those values when generating policy ideas. This separation provides what H.A. Simon calls “procedural rationality.” The decision premise of public servants is (1) an apolitical commitment to government service, and (2) a commitment to advise on and implement the current government values, including expert advice using their personal and institutional memory and procedural knowledge. Using evidence from Australia and the United Kingdom, we track the de‐separation of political careers. Policy advice increasingly comes from outside the career public service, including politically appointed special advisors. Furthermore, senior politicians are increasingly drawn from the world of special and external advisors. De‐separation changes the decision premise of all actors, which we argue deleteriously affects the nature of policy formation.