A comparison of capital standards and proprietary surveillance as mechanisms for regulating financial market risk in the EUjel code: g28.
分析了欧盟资本充足指令与巴塞尔委员会提案两种市场风险监管方法，发现巴塞尔提案在特定条件下能提升监管效率，而资本充足指令的双重目标难以协调。
The EC's Capital Adequacy Directive (CAD) and the 1995 Basle Committee (BC) proposals are analysed as approaches to regulating market risk. We derive conditions under which the BC's proposal, namely supplementing a CAD-type standardized risk measurement framework with proprietary procedures subject to market surveillence, enhance regulatory efficiency. We demonstrate that the BC's approach enhances efficiency, unless asset deficiencies imply an institution has insufficient incentives to effectively implement proprietary procedures. Moreover, the CAD's dual objective, namely ensuring the prudential safety of, and promoting competitive equality in, the financial services market cannot be reconciled without imposing restrictive assumptions on the regulator's information set. © 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.