PETTY CORRUPTION AND CITIZEN REPORTS
研究政府如何通过公民举报机制来遏制低层官员的腐败行为，同时改善监管执行。模型显示，允许企业家直接向政府报告自身违规行为，能有效遏制腐败并提升监管效果。
Abstract When offering incentive schemes to low‐ranking officials, a tension exists between the dual goals of enforcing regulations and preventing corruption. Recent efforts to curb abuses have inspired government interest in using new communication technologies to collect information directly from citizens. We propose a model where a corruptible official is tasked with recommending the government to grant or deny the permit an entrepreneur needs to undertake production. The government tolerates corruption when it does not communicate directly with the entrepreneur. A simple scheme whereby the entrepreneur can report her own noncompliance to the government deters corruption and improves regulatory enforcement.