When Is Society Susceptible to Manipulation?
研究了一个社会学习模型，其中代理人通过个人观察和信息交换学习，而一个主体（如企业或政府）利用“群体智慧”现象操纵代理人的信念，使其采取对主体有利的行动。分析了易受操纵的社会规范和网络结构，并提出了抗操纵网络的设计条件。
We consider a social learning model where agents learn about an underlying state of the world from individual observations as well as from exchanging information with each other. A principal (e.g., a firm or a government) interferes with the learning process in order to manipulate the beliefs of the agents. By utilizing the same forces that give rise to the “wisdom of the crowd” phenomenon, the principal can get the agents to take an action that is not necessarily optimal for them but is in the principal’s best interest. We characterize the social norms and network structures that are susceptible to this kind of manipulation and derive conditions under which a social network is impervious and cannot be manipulated. In the process, we develop a new centrality measure and describe how our model offers insights into designing networks that are resistant to manipulation. This paper was accepted by Gabriel Weintraub, revenue management and market analytics.