Common belief in rationality in psychological games
证明在心理博弈中，任何基于信念的效用函数都能与共同理性信念相容，并给出递归消去程序来刻画这一信念，对研究愤怒、内疚等动机的学者有用。
Psychological games enable us to study diverse motivations like anger, guilt, and intention-based reciprocity using models of rational strategic choice based on common belief in rationality (aka correlated rationalizability). This is achieved by letting utility depend not only on outcomes and beliefs about others’ behavior but also on higher-order beliefs. It is an open question whether such belief-dependent utilities can be made consistent with common belief in rationality in all empirically relevant cases. In this paper, we use a novel existence condition to show that common belief in rationality is possible for any empirically relevant case of belief-dependent utility. In addition, we present a recursive elimination procedure that characterizes common belief in rationality under minimal assumptions on belief-dependent utility functions.