Regulatory Approval and Biotechnology Product Disclosures
研究了美国生物技术公司如何随着产品通过不同监管阶段而调整自愿披露水平，发现无论批准还是拒绝，后期阶段披露更多，尤其对无内部资金来源的公司更明显。
ABSTRACT This study examines the effect of regulatory approval on a firm's voluntary product‐level disclosures. We focus on the US biotechnology industry, a setting that allows direct observation of whether firms disclose more information as products proceed through well‐defined—though successively more complex and costly—regulatory hurdles. Consistent with predictions motivated by biotech firms' need to repeatedly raise capital, we find that firms disclose more as their products move to later stages in the development process, both when the products receive regulatory approvals as well as when they receive regulatory denials. In addition, these findings are consistent across phases of development as well as product disclosure categories and are accentuated for firms without internal sources of capital (i.e., lacking product revenue). Collectively, these findings reveal that biotechnology firms respond to the considerable incentives to provide enhanced product disclosure and thus facilitate their ongoing need for capital to proceed through subsequent stages of product development.