Matching auctions
研究平台市场中代理人陆续到达、偏好随时间变化且频繁重新匹配的情况，设计了一种简单拍卖机制，在特定条件下能最大化利润、福利或两者组合，并揭示了平台市场势力导致的扭曲。
Abstract We study platform markets in which agents arrive gradually, experience changes to their preferences over time, and are frequently re‐matched. We introduce simple auctions specifically designed for such markets. Upon joining, agents select a status that determines the weight assigned to their future bids. Each match is then assigned a score that depends on the agents' reciprocal bids and status. The matches maximizing the sum of the bilateral scores are implemented. Under certain conditions, such auctions maximize profits, welfare, or a combination of the two. We use the results to shed light on the distortions due to platforms' market power.