Rationing the Commons
研究了印度拉贾斯坦邦农业地下水使用中配给制如何影响资源利用的效率和公平，发现配给制虽使平均用水量接近社会最优，但因跨农户配置不当导致效率低下，皮古改革可提升农业剩余但无法实现帕累托改进。
Common resources may be managed with inefficient policies for the sake of equity. We study how rationing the commons shapes the efficiency and equity of resource use in the context of agricultural groundwater use in Rajasthan, India. We find that rationing binds on input use, such that farmers, despite trivial prices for water extraction, use roughly the socially optimal amount of water on average. The rationing regime is still grossly inefficient, because it misallocates water across farmers, lowering productivity. Pigouvian reform would increase agricultural surplus by 12% of household income yet fall well short of a Pareto improvement over rationing.