Regulating Product Communication
研究了惩罚企业虚假沟通的信息监管如何产生意外后果，发现高罚款仅在沟通成本低时改善福利，低罚款总比无罚款更差。
Information regulation that penalizes deceptive communication by firms can have significant unintended consequences. We consider a market where competing firms communicate private information about product quality through a combination of pricing and direct communication (advertising or labeling) that may be false. A higher fine for lying reduces the reliance on price signaling, thereby lowering market power and consumption distortions; however, it may lead to excessive disclosure. Low fines are always worse than no fines. High fines are welfare improving only if communication itself is inexpensive. Penalizing false claims may reduce profits of both high- and low-quality firms.