Why Do Directors Join Poorly Performing Firms?
研究发现，近60%的业绩不佳公司能在董事离职后任命新董事，新董事更可能获得领导职位而非更高薪酬，并因此获得职业收益，尤其是资历较浅者，这支持了领导职位的认证效应。
Abstract Prior research has suggested that sitting on the board of a poorly performing firm (PPF) can be undesirable to directors. Still, almost 60% of such firms are able to appoint new directors following director departures. Contrary to a quality matching explanation, we do not find that only poorly performing directors join these firms. Upon joining PPFs, directors are more likely to fill leadership positions without necessarily receiving higher pay. These directors subsequently receive career benefits, especially those who are relatively junior in the pool. As such, the evidence is consistent with the leadership positions providing a certification effect.