Repositioning and market power after airline mergers
研究航空公司合并后是否调整航线服务类型（直飞或中转）以及如何影响市场势力和价格，对反垄断政策制定者评估合并效果有参考价值。
Abstract We estimate a model of route‐level competition between airlines who choose whether to offer nonstop or connecting service before setting prices. Airlines have full information about all quality, marginal cost, and fixed cost unobservables throughout the game, so that service choices will be selected on these residuals. We conduct merger simulations that allow for repositioning and account for the selection implied by the model and the data. Accounting for selection materially affects the predicted likelihood of repositioning and the predicted magnitude of post‐merger price changes, and it allows us to match what has been observed after consummated mergers.